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structural and Non-Structural Alternatives for 
Accommodating Larger Floods at Dams 
Louis E. BUckl, A.M. ASCE 
Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of structural and 
non-structural alternatives for accommodating larger 
floods at dams. The first two alternatives discussed, 
raising the height of the project and/or lowering the 
reservoir pool, can be used to prevent overtopping by 
increasing the available floodwater detention storage in 
the reservoir. Data gathered by an ASCE task committee 
survey on modifications that include increased storage by 
raising project height are summarized and discussed. The 
third alternative discussed, early warning systems, can 
provide a low cost alternative to structural 
modifications. Case studies for the warning systems at 
the Santee Cooper North Dam and the TVA Blue Ridge Dam 
are presented. 
Introduction 
Since the Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety were 
published in 1979, dam owners have been assessing the 
safety of their dams in regard to current design 
criteria. For those projects that were shown to be 
hydrologically deficient, modifications that would allow 
the project to safety pass an appropriate design flood 
were evaluated. Numerous projects have been modified 
since 1979 to meet present hydrologic design criteria. 
In order to inventory and evaluate alternatives for 
safely accommodating new or revised design floods, the 
ASCE Hydraulics Division Task Committee on Alternatives 
for Overtopping Protection was established. 
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This paper discusses the findings of the ASCE task 
committee specifically relating to dam safety 
modifications that include parapet walls and/or raising 
embankments with original construction materials in order 
to prevent overtopping. The committee obtained data for 
their survey through personal knowledge, a literature 
search, and a survey of the engineering community. The 
survey involved sending out questionnaires developed by 
the committee for data collection and cataloging, 
reviewing, and evaluating alternatives. Although not a 
part of the survey, two non-structural alternatives that 
can be used to accommodate larger floods are also 
discussed. 
structural Alternatives 
Increased floodwater detention storage can be 
achieved structurally by ralslng the height of the 
project. Typically, only the sections of the project 
that would erode and/or fail during overtopping are 
raised. 
The height of nonoverflow sections such as earthen 
embankments can be increased using construction materials 
similar to those used during original construction or by 
adding a concrete parapet wall to the top of the existing 
embankments. If the project includes a roadway, a 1 to 
1.5 m continuous concrete wall that resembles a standard 
traffic barrier can be used to increase the height of 
nonoverflow sections without a noticeable change in the 
project appearance. Tall parapet walls (greater than 
about 2 m in height) are generally not selected over 
construction materials such as earth or rockfill due to 
aesthetic, safety, and vandalism concerns. If original 
construction materials are used to increase the height of 
the project, additional material may be required on the 
downstream embankment slope to maintain a minimum factor 
of safety for slope stability. 
Concrete sections that support facilities such as 
spillway bays and navigation locks are typically allowed 
to overtop during large design floods. However, they are 
often strengthened to resist the additional loads 
produced by higher reservoir stages or modified to 
prevent damage from overtopping flows. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the structural 
alternatives that increase reservoir storage reported in 
the survey. Five projects were reported that used 
parapet walls to increase the height of the dam. Eight 
projects were reported that used original construction 
materials to raise the dam and two used a combination of 
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parapet walls and original construction materials. 
Except for McCloud Dam in California, the design of these 
structures provided for passing the full PMF. 
Table 1 - Survey Results 
Projects with Increased Height 
Height 
Project Location Raised Owner 
(m) 
Brea Dam California 0.9 USCOE 
Butt Valley Dam California 1.2 PG & E 
Cherokee Dam Tennessee 2.4 TVA 
Clearwater Dam Missouri 0.9 LRD 
Fort Loudoun Dam Tennessee 1.0 TVA 
Beech Dam Tennessee 1.4 TVA 
Boone Dam Tennessee 2.6 TVA 
Chatuge Dam N.Carolina 2.0 TVA 
McCloud Dam California 1.8 PG & E 
Mud Mountain Dam Washington 2.1 USCOE 
Nottely Dam Georgia 4.6 TVA 
pitt Forebay Dam California 2.0 PG & E 
Watagua Dam Tennessee 3.1 TVA 
Douglas Dam Tennessee 1.7 TVA 
Nuclear Lake Dam New York 1.2 NPS 

















2. Raised with original construction materials 
3. Additional spillway capacity also provided 
4. 50% PMF modification 
Nonstructural Alternatives 
Increased floodwater detention storage can be 
achieved nonstructurally by lowering the reservoir pool. 
Either a predetermined operational strategy that lowers 
the pool prior to the arrival of flood inflows, a 
permanent lowering of the normal pool, or a combination 
of the two can be used to increase the available 
floodwater detention storage. If an operational strategy 
is used, factors such as gate reliability, gate opening 
time, staff availability, and flood arrival time should 
be carefully evaluated to ensure that the project will 
operate when and as needed during an event. Except in 
si tuations where there are upstream conditions that 
provide ample lead time, reservoir operating requirements 
alone typically cannot be considered a reliable 
alternative to safely pass larger floods. 
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A permanent lowering of the normal reservoir pool 
can, in some cases, provide additional low-cost 
floodwater detention storage. Adjustments to the normal 
reservoir pool are often feasible at relatively small 
nonpower projects with limited shoreline development. 
Although lower lake levels could impact existing uses 
such as shoreline development and recreation, offsetting 
project benefits may be available from additional 
downstream flood protection, improved water quality, and 
stable lake levels. 
Public op1n1on concerning lower lake levels and the 
potential impacts on existing project purposes should be 
carefully evaluated. Public involvement and education 
early in the planning process is essential to the success 
of any alternative that changes existing lake levels. In 
a recent study of operating priorities for its dams and 
reservoirs, TVA used a three step process that involved 
written comments from individuals and groups, public 
information sessions and intensive planning meetings with 
small groups structured to represent a broad range of 
interests to identify critical issues. Figure 1 
highlights some of the conflicting forces acting on lake 
levels over time (Tennessee Valley Authority, 1990). 
Recreation [) ~ Flood Control, Navigation and Tourism on Downstream Rivers 
Residential [) ~ Hydropower Energy Losses Development 
Indirect Economic [) ~RePlacement Power Costs Growth from Above Factors 
Scenic [) ~Air Quality from Added Resources Coal-fired Generation 
Quality of [) ~ Temperature of Fishery Tributary Tailwaters 
Navigation on [) ~ state Habitat Downstream Rivers Management Programs 
Time 
Figure 1. Forces Acting on the Timing of Lake Levels 
1232 HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING 
Early Warning Systems 
Early warning and/or dam failure warning systems 
typically offer a low cost alternative to structural 
modifications. The survey results indicate that early 
warning systems are being considered at numerous 
locations. However, experience with warning systems 
designed for dam failure situations is extremely limited 
and mixed. The warning systems at Santee Cooper Project 
located in eastern South Carolina and the Blue Ridge Dam 
located in northern Georgia provide the only performance 
records for existing installations of early warning 
systems designed specifically for dam failures. 
The warning system at the Santee Cooper North Dam 
was designed to address the possibility of breaching in 
the event of seismic acti vi ty . The warning system 
alternative was selected because of the prohibitive cost 
of a new dam ($500,000,000) and the small population at 
risk. It is estimated that it would take at least ten 
hours for the flood waters resulting from the postulated 
dam breach to reach the initial downstream population 
center which includes about 52 residences on the fringes 
of the inundation area. The final cost of the warning 
system is estimated at $5,000,000 with annual maintenance 
costs of about $50,000. Since the initial testing of the 
system in early 1987, Santee Cooper personnel have been 
highly satisfied with its performance. Cooperation among 
the downstream residents and the various local and state 
agencies has been good. 
Modifications at the Tennessee Valley Authority's 
(TVA) Blue Ridge Dam included increasing the existing 
spillway capacity by 60 percent and installing a 
downstream dam failure warning system. Both economic and 
environmental considerations led to the selection of the 
comprehensive dam failure warning system which was 
completed in 1984 at a total cost of approximately $10.7 
million. The cost for the dam failure warning system was 
approximately $1.1 million. There are about 850 
residences at risk below the Blue Ridge Dam. These 
residences are located in two small towns, one in Georgia 
and one in Tennessee, and in the rural areas around these 
communities. Unlike the Santee Cooper project, a 
significant portion of the residents at risk below the 
Blue Ridge Dam have maintained a rather complacent 
attitude about the warning system. Some have signed 
papers that they do not want a tone alert radio in their 
home. others have neglected to have their radios 
maintained even though maintenance and battery 
replacement are provided free of charge. The dam failure 
warning system has been in place for 7 years, and TVA 
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continues to review its overall effectiveness. Al though 
annual maintenance costs to ensure a high degree of 
reliability for the system were estimated to be $50,000 
in 1980, by 1989 the annual maintenance costs had risen 
to about $250,000. At present, resident apathy, system 
reliability and increasing annual maintenance costs 
continue to persist. 
A survey completed in December 1987 summarizes the 
performance records of these two projects and 16 other 
early warning systems designed primarily for flash floods 
(Gruntfest, 1987). Although each of these systems was 
designed for a different situation, many systems 
exhibited similar problems such as the need for 
redundancy, lack of maintenance funding, lack of local 
commitment to the project and the tendency to overrely on 
warning systems. 
Before selecting an early warning system in lieu of 
structural modifications, failure consequences should be 
carefully evaluated. In addition to economic 
consequences, social and environmental consequences such 
as the population at risk, emergency costs, loss of life 
and community and emotional trauma should also be 
considered. A report prepared by the ASCE Task Committee 
on Spillway Design Flood Selection provides guidance on 
identifying impacts of dam failure which are not 
adequately evaluated by current economic analysis 
practices (American Society of civil Engineers, 1988). 
References 
American Society of civil Engineers, 1988, "Evaluation 
Procedures for Hydrologic Safety of Dams," Report 
by the Task Committee on Spillway Design Flood 
Selection of the Committee on Surface Water 
Hydrology of the Hydraulics Division. 
Gruntfest, E., 1987, "Flash Flood/Dam Failure warning 
System Survey", Prepared for the Bureau of 
Reclamation with the university of Colorado. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 1990, "Final Environmental 
Impact Statement, Tennessee River and Reservoir 
System Operation and Planning Review." 
